A Multiagent Solution to Adaptively Classify SOAP Message and Protect against DoS Attack by Pinzón Trejos, Cristian et al.
P. Meseguer, L. Mandow, and R.M. Gasca (Eds.): CAEPIA 2009, LNAI 5988, pp. 181–190, 2010. 
© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2010 
A Multiagent Solution to Adaptively Classify SOAP 
Message and Protect against DoS Attack 
Cristian I. Pinzón, Juan F. De Paz, Javier Bajo, and Juan M. Corchado 
Universidad de Salamanca, Plaza de la Merced s/n, 37008, Salamanca, Spain 
{cristian_ivanp,fcofds,jbajope,corchado}@usal.es 
Abstract. SOAP messages use XML code, which makes them vulnerable to 
denial of service (DoS) attacks and puts the availability of web services at risk. 
This article presents an adaptive solution for dealing with DoS attacks in web 
service environments. The solution proposes a distributed hierarchical multi-
agent architecture that implements a robust mechanism of classification based 
on an advanced CBR-BDI agent. The agent incorporates a case-based reasoning 
engine that integrate a Perceptron Multilayer neural network during the re-use 
phase to classify incoming SOAP messages and reject those that are considered 
malicious. A prototype of the architecture was developed and the results ob-
tained are presented in this study. 
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1   Introduction 
In order to obtain interoperability between web service platforms, communication 
between web servers is carried out via an exchange of messages. These messages, 
referred to as SOAP messages, are based on standard XML and are primarily ex-
changed using HTTP (Hyper Text Transfer Protocol) [1]. XML messages must be 
parsed in the server, which opens the possibility of an attack if the messages them-
selves are not well structured or if they include some type of malicious code. Re-
sources available in the server (memory and CPU cycles) can be drastically reduced 
or exhausted while a malicious SOAP message is being parsed. This type of attack is 
known as a denial of service (DoS) attack and is perpetrated at the web service level 
because of the intrinsic relationship it has with the XML standard for coding SOAP 
messages. 
A number of standards for guaranteeing the security of messages have been pro-
posed to date, including WS-Security [2], WS-Policy [3], WS-Trust [4], WS-
SecureConversation [5], etc. However, the proposed solutions focus exclusively on 
the aspects of message integrity and confidentiality, and user authentication and au-
thorization [5]. 
This article presents a distributed hierarchical multiagent architecture for dealing 
with DoS attacks in web service environments. The architecture incorporates a CBR-
BDI [7] agent with reasoning, learning and adaptation capabilities. The idea of a CBR 
mechanism is to exploit the experience gained from similar problems in the past and 
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then adapt successful solutions to the current problem. The CBR engine initiates what 
is known as the CBR cycle, which is comprised of 4 phases. The classifier agent uses 
a Multilayer Perceptron neural network (MLP), which is incorporated into the re-use 
phase of the CBR cycle. By combining the CBR mechanism and the MLP, the system 
acquires learning capabilities and is able to adapt to changes in attack patterns for 
SOAP messages, thus facilitating the classification task when a SOAP message con-
tains a DoS attack. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: section 2 presents the problem that 
has prompted most of this research work. Section 3 focuses on the details of the mul-
tiagent architecture; section 4 explains in detail the classification model integrated 
within the classifier agent. Finally, section 5 describes how the classifier agent has 
been tested and presents the results obtained.  
2   Web Service Security Problem Description 
Attacks usually occur when the SOAP messages either come from a malicious user or 
are intercepted during the transmission by a malicious node that introduces different 
kinds of attacks. 
The following list contains descriptions of some known types of attacks that can 
result in a DoS attack, as noted in [8] [9] [10]. 
• Oversize Payload: It reduces or eliminates the availability of a web service when 
a message with a large payload is parsed within the server. 
• Coercive Parsing: An XML parser can analyze a complex format and lead to an 
attack because the memory and processing resources are being used up. 
• Injection XML: The structure of a XML document is modified with a malicious 
code. 
• SOAP header attack: Some SOAP message headers are overwritten while they 
are passing through different nodes before arriving at their destination. 
• Replay Attack: Sent messages are completely valid, but they are sent en masse 
over short periods of time in order to overload the web service. 
All web service security standards focus on strategies independent from DoS attacks 
[5]. In the following, we will revise those works that focus on denial of web service 
attacks and will compare to our approach as shown in Table 1. 
A “XML Firewall” is proposed by [8]. Messages that are sent to a web service are 
intercepted and parsed to check the validity and the authenticity of the contents. If the 
contents of the messages do not conform to the policies that have been set, the mes-
sages will be dropped by the firewall. Gruschka and Luttenberger [6] propose an 
application level gateway system “Checkway”. They focus on a full grammatical 
validation of messages by Checkway before forwarding them to the server. Checkway 
generates an XML Schema from a web service description and validates all web ser-
vice messages against this schema. An adaptive framework for the prevention and 
detection of intrusions was presented in [9]. Based on a hybrid focus that combines 
agents, data mining and diffused logic, it is supposed to filter attacks that are either 
already known or new. Agents that act as sensors are used to detect violations to the 
normal profile using the data mining technique such as clustering, association rules 
